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Abstract 
This paper reviews the economic justification for voluntary environmental programs to derive 
defensible measures of their positive social outcomes. We consider ideal experimental and statistical 
designs to detect and attribute benefits. We also explore a set of more practical approaches to benefit 
attribution that take into account the data gaps and statistical challenges that often make more rigorous 
approaches infeasible. 
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Attributing Benefits to Voluntary Programs in EPA’s Office of 
Resource Conservation and Recovery: Challenges and Options  
James Boyd and Cynthia Manson 
1. Introduction 
For more than a decade, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Office of 
Resource Conservation and Recovery (ORCR) has implemented public voluntary or partnership 
programs (referred to collectively as PVPs) as a collaborative, nonregulatory approach to 
encouraging pollution prevention, recycling, and input and waste reductions. As these efforts 
have gained in popularity in both ORCR and other EPA offices, the need to measure their 
impacts and benefits has emerged as a key challenge for ORCR and EPA. In particular, the 
White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has emphasized the need for ORCR, 
and EPA more broadly, to demonstrate defensible approaches for documenting voluntary 
program outcomes.  
A key component of gauging program success is identifying and attributing specific 
positive outcomes (or benefits) to the initiative under consideration (Ferraro, 2009). In the 
specific context of ORCR’s and EPA’s voluntary programs, the goal of attribution analysis is to 
identify socially desirable changes in behavior that would not have occurred, or would not have 
occurred as widely or as quickly, in the absence of PVPs. The nature of voluntary programs 
presents a variety of challenges that often call for variations on the rigorous statistical approaches 
that analysts might otherwise pursue to assess attribution. 
To respond to questions from OMB and other stakeholders, ORCR has investigated 
existing research on the attribution of voluntary program benefits, including the theoretical basis 
for voluntary program benefits, and a range of empirical and theoretical methods for assessing 
benefits. This effort, though initially focused on ORCR programs, has broader relevance to EPA 
partnership programs in all offices and is designed to address agencywide challenges.   
Our study explores PVP attribution in several ways. First, the analysis reviews the 
economic justification for voluntary programs, highlighting the categories of programs that EPA 
most frequently administers. Second, the analysis considers experimental design and full-scale 
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statistical approaches to benefit attribution as well as the challenges that frequently make these 
rigorous approaches infeasible.  Finally, the analysis examines a series of practical approaches 
for attributing benefits to PVPs. The objective is to identify three distinct analytical levels that 
progress from qualitative assessment of program design to quasi-experimental designs that can 
provide robust quantitative estimates of program impact.  
2. Voluntary Programs and Their Economic Justification 
From an economic standpoint, the case for PVPs (or any environmental regulation or 
policy), is strongest if the case can be made that the government activity is addressing a market 
failure—a situation in which the market forces alone to provide efficient environmental 
outcomes. PVPs are one category of policy intervention designed to compensate for market 
failures.  
The general market failure that creates the need for all environmental policy interventions 
is the lack of adequate incentives for private parties—whether organizations or individuals—to 
contribute to the quantity or quality of shared, common-pool resources, or public goods, such as 
clean air, clean water, and uncontaminated land (see, for example, Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990). 
A related motivation for policy intervention is the desire to address externalities—a situation in 
which a polluter or injurer imposes costs on others, including private property owners. These 
market failures are the fundamental justification for all environmental regulation, public 
investments, and protections. In the case of PVPs, the goal is to encourage behavioral change 
that goes beyond regulatory and other legal requirements to provide the shared public goods 
associated with environmental improvement (e.g., improvements in human health and ecological 
resources).  
All environmental PVPs are designed to address this general failure of the market to 
adequately price the protection of public goods, such as human health and environmental quality. 
PVP design, however, typically focuses on two distinct market failures more specific to private 
sector users of resources and generators of waste. Depending on the type of program design, 
PVPs may address inefficient investments in environmental process, management, and product 
innovation. 
  PVPs designed to encourage organizational and technical learning (which we call 
technical assistance PVPs) address the failure to invest in research and development 
(R&D) and technological innovation (e.g., because these are, in part, public goods). 
  PVPs that provide signaling features to the market (e.g., suppliers and customers) address 




processes; specifically, incomplete information can result in decisions that create 
negative environmental impacts, or externalities (see Darnall and Carmin 2005; Borck 
and Coglianese 2009).  
Recent research has considered another potential failure: the failure of organizations to 
individually behave rationally in their own self-interest—that is, they fail to identify and act on 
profit-making opportunities, such as pollution prevention or other money-saving efforts (Sarokin 
et al. 1985). The explanations for why firms might not act in their own self-interest are various 
and include information barriers, accounting-based distortions, or inappropriate managerial 
incentive schemes. At the same time, so-called behavioral economics increasingly emphasizes 
the importance of psychological realities that conflict with purely rational maximizing behavior 
(e.g., Thaler and Sunstein 2008). 
This paper focuses on two market failures—the public good nature of intellectual 
property and information asymmetry—to judge the case for government intervention. Arguably, 
organizational failures and behavioral economics should also be considered, though the literature 
on these areas is still evolving, and it is not clear that the evidence supports a broad case for 
government intervention. This paper does not, therefore, incorporate organizational failure or 
behavioral economics into a broad framework for assessing voluntary programs. 
Importantly, because PVPs are voluntary, economists also consider whether these 
programs merely identify behavior that would have occurred without the program (as a result of 
existing market conditions).
1 It is important for PVPs, therefore, to clearly identify how they 
encourage behavioral change beyond that which would occur in the market. The discussion 
below describes in more detail these two types of PVPs and the market failures they address as 
well as implications for attributing benefits to such PVPs. 
2.1 Technical Assistance PVPs and the Promotion of Innovation 
Technical assistance PVPs, as discussed in this paper, include programs that promote 
information sharing and knowledge transfer regarding green production processes, organizational 
improvements that foster environmental efficiency, and environmentally preferred product 
innovations, as well as the financial benefits of these innovations to program participants. 
Examples of the technical assistance that PVPs offer to members include:  
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  technical guides and best-practice documents;  
  hotline assistance;  
  online technical resources;  
  environmental impact calculators (e.g., carbon calculators); 
  peer mentoring;  
  publication of partner practices and success stories; and  
  conferences, working groups, and teleconferences that facilitate knowledge transfer. 
EPA sponsors several technical assistance PVPs. For example, ORCR’s WasteWise 
program facilitates knowledge transfer between program partners through dedicated conferences. 
In addition, the office also sponsors an annual Resource Conservation Challenge (RCC) 
conference that provides an information-sharing venue for several specific programs, including 
the Coal Combustion Products Partnership (C2P2), WasteWise, the National Partnership for 
Environmental Priorities (NPEP), and a range of municipal and electronic waste efforts. The 
RCC conference provides opportunities to share best practices and successes among program 
participants and across programs. In addition, EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation (OAR) 
sponsors the AgSTAR Program, which encourages the use of methane recovery (biogas) 
technologies at certain confined animal feeding operations. AgSTAR assists agricultural 
producers in adopting anaerobic digester technologies through conferences, a hotline, “how-to” 
project development tools, industry listings, and by conducting performance evaluations for 
digesters and conventional waste management systems. OAR also sponsors Natural Gas Star, 
which partners with the oil and natural gas industry to identify and promote the implementation 
of cost-effective technologies and practices to reduce emissions of methane. As part of Natural 
Gas Star, EPA works with companies to quantify emissions from across the natural gas system, 
facilitate technology transfer, and demonstrate successful greenhouse gas–reduction 
technologies. 
Technical assistance PVPs address a market failure created by the fact that certain types 
of information, such as intellectual property and R&D, are often (but not always) viewed as a 
public good that benefits others—including competitors—as well as the firm undertaking the 
investment. Public goods have two traits that limit their value as investments for a single 




its availability for others. More importantly, public goods are nonexcludable; that is, it is difficult 
or impossible to exclude others from using the good.
2 The value of organizational and technical 
information can be difficult for private parties to fully capture because, once created, information 
tends to be readily copied or used by others.  
Because private parties operating in a free market may not be the only ones to use the 
innovation developed through R&D, they tend to underinvest in creating such information. 
Therefore, it is common for governments to intervene in the market to address this market 
failure. Within economics, R&D is a classic public good example, where the justification for 
public assistance and investment is clear. Policies such as the patent system; R&D tax credits; 
and financial subsidies for research by government bodies, nongovernmental organizations, and 
academic institutions are explicitly designed to encourage R&D because, without such 
incentives, private parties would tend to underinvest in it.  
Technical assistance PVPs can be considered investments in R&D in a broad sense 
because they facilitate knowledge transfer and technological innovation. R&D can promote both 
innovations that reduce production costs, and innovations that lead to more desirable and 
saleable products. Firms’ motivation to participate in PVPs need not be thought of as altruistic. 
To the contrary, lower costs and higher revenues (i.e., higher profits) are likely to be the most 
material drivers for participation in PVPs. Indeed, effective PVPs provide benefits to both the 
participant and broader society by helping to leverage existing (complementary) incentives, such 
as cost savings. As a result, the existence of other motives for undertaking a project does not 
itself prove that a PVP has no impact, though it becomes much more difficult to isolate the 
“cause” of an operational improvement.  
An example of the complexity of motives for participating in PVPs is the decision by 
Okonite to become an NPEP partner. Company representatives noted in a 2009 interview that a 
broad corporate dedication to environmental stewardship, combined with interest in market 
competitiveness and cost savings, were drivers for participation. Participation in the voluntary 
program helped the company decide to invest in upgrades and hastened its efforts to remove lead 
from its processes (James Groome, The Okonite Company, Inc., pers. comm., July and 
November, 2009). 
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Although PVPs do not provide direct financial support to firms or their R&D activities, 
PVPs can lower the cost of innovation by facilitating the distribution of information that reduces 
production costs and/or leads to more desirable and saleable products. This information can be 
costly for an individual firm to acquire on its own. In this way, a PVP can be thought of as a 
subsidy to private R&D. And this government subsidy is justified to the extent that the programs 
provide a public good, namely, technical assistance that encourages socially desirable, efficient 
innovations that would not otherwise have occurred in the same time frame.  
Focus for Attribution of PVP Benefits: Attribution of technical assistance 
benefits should be focused on the ways in which PVPs subsidize and encourage 
R&D that has strong informational public good features. 
2.2 Signaling PVPs and Improving Information 
Signaling PVPs, as used here, are those that provide participants with an independent 
acknowledgement of the environmental quality of their products, processes, or supply chains. 
These programs reward, acknowledge, or certify environmental performance, and thus provide 
firms and other institutions with an independent, credible signal of environmental quality that 
they can market to consumers and clients. It can also be valuable for firms to signal 
environmental performance to financial markets to lower capital costs. Signaling PVPs may 
provide their members with benefits such as: 
  awards and other public recognition; 
  logos that signal participation and performance; 
  certification assistance and verification; and 
  marketing assistance.3 
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counter this general similarity, however. First, whereas social marketing is broadly defined as mass media messages targeting 
the general public (e.g., don’t smoke), signaling PVPs target specific subgroups (e.g., consumers of a particular product). 
Second, signaling PVPs are driven by firms’ desire for competitive advantage. To some, the fact that PVPs provide participating 
firms with tools to market their own products for their own competitive advantage might disqualify them as social marketing. 
Finally, social marketing emphasizes long-term, lasting behavioral change driven by a change in underlying social values. PVPs 
are not currently designed to achieve such goals; instead, they allow consumers to make purchasing decisions based on values 
they already hold. Nonetheless, the basic goal of social marketing—“behavioral change for the social good”—is one way to 
judge the performance of signaling PVPs.  




EPA’s voluntary programs typically provide one or more of these benefits, particularly 
awards or public recognition (e.g., though website recognition and the use of logos). For 
example, the SmartWay Transport program promotes the adoption of advanced clean energy 
technologies and strategies by encouraging retailers (like IKEA and Target) to choose trucking 
and/or rail companies that are environmental leaders in their sectors. The SmartWay label is also 
used to help buyers identify environmentally top-performing passenger vehicles and heavy-duty 
trucks. SmartWay has more than 2,600 partners, such as trucking companies, rail lines, shippers, 
logistics companies, and vehicle manufacturers. EPA’s Indoor airPLUS program is a signaling 
program that provides a label for new homes that meet a comprehensive set of indoor air quality 
specifications. Indoor airPLUS recruits partners in the building industry, including builders and 
home energy raters, as well as home buyers, to promote healthier homes. 
Signaling PVPs address information asymmetries, or market failures in which 
information is incomplete and consumers are unable to easily observe the environmental 
features, qualities, and footprints of the products they purchase. Increasingly, consumers and 
firms seek—and are willing to pay a premium for—products that are environmentally state-of-
the-art. Motivations for this focus can be both altruistic (green consumerism) and financial (firms 
that want to avoid liability arising from their supply chains). Unfortunately, the environmental 
quality of products, processes, supply and distribution chains, and disposal is often difficult for 
consumers to observe. In economic terminology, this information breakdown creates a lemons 
problem (Akerlof 1970).
4 The classic example of a lemons problem involves used cars whose 
underlying quality is difficult for buyers to observe on their own. Lacking precise information, 
rational consumers will purchase cars based on their understanding of a used car’s average 
quality. This means that sellers of above-average quality cars cannot get the price they seek for 
their high-quality cars, and will thus withhold them from the market. Buyers can anticipate this, 
which leads them to further reduce their expectations of average quality. In the end, and left to 
themselves, some markets may provide only the lowest-quality products because of this 
information asymmetry between buyers and sellers. 
If consumers cannot easily distinguish truly “green” firms and products from other firms 
and products, then their willingness to pay more for green products will rationally decrease. As 
in the used car example, this weakens the incentive for producers to provide greener products 
and processes. The public typically does not have comparative information about the materials 
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and waste management issues that ORCR voluntary efforts address (with the possible exception 
of recycled content in goods). 
The economic justification for government intervention as a response to information 
asymmetry is well-established (see Mankiw 2008 485). Market failure associated with 
information asymmetry is a key motivation for truth-in-advertising laws enforced by the Federal 
Trade Commission, product certification by the Food and Drug Administration and Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, and compliance enforcement of technical standards throughout the 
government.  
Signaling can improve the ability of firms to gain a private advantage when they innovate 
environmentally.But in this case, the profit motive yields socially desirable outcomes that occur 
through participation in the program. Government assistance is in the social interest because it 
leads firms to innovate and be able to sell greener products that consumers demand.  
Focus for Attribution of PVP Benefits: Attribution of the benefits of signaling 
features should focus on the ways in which PVPs encourage green product and 
process innovation in situations where green branding and marketing would 
benefit from external validation. 
2.3 Intended Outcomes (Benefits) of PVPs 
It is instructive to characterize the general types of outcomes that technical assistance and 
signaling PVPs seek to produce. Often these programs seek to encourage firms to switch to the 
use of processes that require fewer natural resource inputs or result in smaller amounts of 
pollution released into the environment. For example, PVPs including WasteWise, C2P2, NPEP, 
Natural Gas Star, and focused efforts such as Carpet America Recovery Effort (CARE) and 
AgStar all are designed to produce this type of process change outcome. PVPs may also 
encourage end-product design changes that enhance recyclability or reuse; alterations to the 
supply chain that either directly or indirectly yield environmental benefits; managerial practices 
(e.g., lifecycle assessment, environmental accounting rules, or health and safety protocols); and 
changes in a firm’s overall product mix.  
Participation in a PVP by a firm or other organization is not prima facie evidence that the 
PVP is producing its intended outcomes. In some cases, PVPs could be encouraging innovations 
that firms would invest in regardless of the PVP. In many situations, firms conduct their own 
R&D and marketing without government involvement. Recent interviews conducted with NPEP 
participants illustrated this point: more than half of the interviewees indicated that their 




some cases, NPEP commitment either sped up implementation or prioritized the project to 
continue through difficult economic circumstances. The challenge, then, is to characterize the 
degree to which PVPs result in outcomes above and beyond those that firms would pursue out of 
their own self-interest. 
2.4 Conventional Regulatory Requirements as an Alternative (or Complement) to 
PVPs 
This analysis argues that PVPs are most likely to be socially beneficial in the presence of 
an underlying market failure that nonregulatory government intervention can address. However, 
the same set of circumstances often justifies consideration of conventional regulatory 
interventions. Although a comprehensive comparison of regulatory interventions versus PVP 
interventions is beyond the scope of this research, we acknowledge the importance and value of 
such a study.  
A thorough study would address several questions.  
  What regulatory options are available to address market failures targeted by PVPs? 
  What conditions favor regulatory versus “PVP-type” interventions? 
  Are there opportunities for coordinated regulatory and PVP interventions? 
Consider the market failure associated with the nature of innovation/R&D as a public 
good. Regulatory interventions to address this market failure (i.e., interventions with the same 
basic aim as technical assistance PVPs) might include mandatory pollution-prevention planning 
and industrywide training programs. Reporting mandates, such as the Toxics Release Inventory 
(TRI), represent another category of potentially applicable regulatory strategies. These types of 
interventions are intended (at least partly) to stimulate knowledge creation and innovation within 
the industrial sector.  
As noted, signaling PVPs address the market failure that arises when consumers are 
unable to easily observe the environmental features, qualities, and footprints of the products they 
purchase. Regulatory alternatives to signaling PVPs include mandatory labeling requirements 
(e.g., mandatory energy or fuel efficiency ratings), tighter product design standards, 
manufacturing rules, and standards applied to suppliers (e.g., forest product certification). 
A comprehensive environmental and economic comparison of PVPs to regulatory 
alternatives would help underscore the unique strengths of PVPs. It is also possible that, under 
some circumstances, regulation (or PVPs that include regulatory elements) could serve the public 




2.5 The Role of Organizational Failures 
The framework proposed in this study rests on the assumption that firms are motivated by 
a desire to maximize profits and are able to identify and act on profit-making opportunities. A 
competing school of thought holds that firms are not always rational, profit-maximizing 
“machines.” One argument is that pollution prevention can often save firms money but is not 
undertaken. For example, an analysis of waste reduction at chemical plants concluded that waste 
reduction occurred in some cases only in response to regulation, though plants found it to be 
cost-effective once in practice (Sarokin et al. 1985). The explanations for why firms might not 
act in their own self-interest are various and include information barriers, accounting-based 
distortions, or inappropriate managerial incentive schemes. At the same time, behavioral 
economics increasingly emphasizes the importance of psychological realities that conflict with 
purely rational maximizing behavior (e.g., Thaler and Sunstein 2008). 
This paper focuses on two market failures—the public good nature of intellectual 
property and information asymmetry—to judge the case for government intervention. Arguably, 
organizational failures should also be considered because, clearly, firms are not perfectly 
rational, profit-maximizing machines. Indeed, organizational failures are reflected in the value of 
certain forms of technical assistance, such as improvement in environmental accounting tools 
and practices. EPA (1995) has documented problematic accounting practices with the potential 
to bias environmental decisionmaking. Frequent targets for criticism are the allocation of 
environmental costs to general overhead accounts, the failure to account for future contingent 
liabilities, and the failure to measure the impact of environmental decisions on corporate image 
and customer and supplier relationships. This perspective has, in turn, motivated a growing 
literature on financial and accounting methodologies to improve accounting practices (Boyd 
1998a; Moilanen and Martin 1996; Epstein 1996). 
It is difficult, however, to argue that organizational failures create a broad rationale for 
any government assistance or investment. First, firm irrationality is a matter of degree. For their 
part, corporate environmental managers tend to be more skeptical of pollution prevention’s 
inherent profitability. They point to regulatory barriers that reduce the financial incentive to 
change production processes or to introduce new products with uncertain regulatory mandates. 
Evidence for the profitability of pollution-prevention opportunities is decidedly mixed. For 
instance, EPA (1991) evaluated a broad set of source-reduction options at a large-scale 
petroleum refinery. Most of the options were found to have negative rates of return and only one 
had a rate of return higher than the historical rate of return for projects at the refinery. Another 
study (Boyd 2000, 1998b) found evidence that contradicts the view that firms suffer from 




pollution-prevention investments. Instead, projects foundered because of significant unresolved 
technical difficulties, marketing challenges, and regulatory barriers. 
These complexities make the detection of organizational failures difficult and often 
subjective. Consequently, organizational-failure arguments can complicate attribution claims and 
even weaken the case for PVPs. Theoretically, if firms do not predictably make environmental 
improvements that save them money, the case for mandatory command-and-control type 
regulation is strengthened. Voluntary efforts, even more than command-type regulation, depend 
on firm rationality in that they require firms to be rational enough to voluntarily take action. 
As a result, the approaches laid out in this paper do not attempt to isolate the potential 
impacts of organizational failures, though these types of information and decision failures are in 
some cases reflected in responses to technical assistance efforts. 
3. Analytical Approaches To Attributing Outcomes to PVPs 
The primary objective of this paper is to identify practical and theoretically defensible 
approaches that EPA program managers can use to characterize the benefits of PVPs. 
Experimental design and rigorous statistical analysis represent useful starting points when 
examining analytical options. The discussion below describes the structure and goals of these 
rigorous approaches as well as the challenges they pose; these challenges motivate the more 
practical approaches examined in subsequent sections. 
3.1 Experimental Design and the Two-Stage Method 
In theory, the strongest approach for measuring a program’s benefits involves 
experimental design (sometimes called randomized control trials, or RCTs). This approach 
begins with random assignment of potential program participants to a treatment group that 
participates in a program, and a control group that does not. (In other words, entities have no 
choice about whether they participate in the program.) This is the approach that scientists often 
use when testing a new drug: they randomly assign participants to be in the treatment group, 
which receives the test drug, or the control group, which receives no drug (or a placebo). 
Because researchers randomly assign potential participants, the treatment and control groups can 
be considered statistically equivalent. This allows researchers to control for other variables (e.g., 
age or, in the case of PVPs, firm size or sector) and directly attribute observed differences 
between the treatment group and control group to the intervention (e.g., the drug being tested or 




A fundamental problem with applying an experimental design to assessing the impacts of 
PVPs is that an experimental design relies on random assignment to a treatment or control group. 
By the very nature of PVPs as voluntary programs, it is not possible to assign entities to 
participate in a PVP, nor is it generally considered acceptable for a government program to 
exclude eligible entities from a PVP. Therefore, experimental designs are not well-suited for 
evaluation of PVPs.  
An alternative approach to assessing the outcomes of PVPs is to approximate an RCT by 
comparing existing program participants to those that do not participate (i.e., a comparison 
group).
5 Researchers would ideally choose a comparison group of nonparticipants that is as 
similar as possible to the participant group in known characteristics (e.g., company type, markets 
served, and firm size). It is also possible to use statistical approaches to control for characteristics 
in comparison groups that might affect outcomes. We use the term two-stage method to describe 
approaches that correct for nonrandomly selected samples (Heckman, 1979)..  
The essential steps for conducting a two-stage method to assess a PVP include the 
following. 
  First, program managers would segregate potential program participants into treatment 
and comparison groups; that is, one group that participates in the program and another 
that does not. The groups would not be randomly assigned because program participants 
would volunteer to participate in the PVP. However, program managers could try to 
ensure that the characteristics of the comparison group match those of program 
participants. 
  Second, program managers would identify key outcomes of interest and collect the 
requisite data. For instance, this might involve tracking waste generation among firms in 
the treatment and comparison (nonparticipant) groups.  
  Finally, program managers or evaluators would use quantitative methods to test for 
statistically significant differences between the treatment and comparison groups. The 
analysis would control for other influences on the outcome of interest to characterize the 
true net effect of the program intervention.  
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3.2 Challenges Associated with the Two-Stage Method  
The specific features of voluntary programs make it difficult, and often impractical, to use a full-
scale statistical analysis to assess the outcomes of PVPs.
6 The discussion below highlights 
several important obstacles: (a) sample bias, (b) breadth of confounding factors, (c) non-uniform 
interventions and outcomes, (d) ambiguous intervention events, and (e) spillover effects.  
Sample Bias 
Using full-scale statistical approaches to analyze comparison groups is subject to sample 
bias; in other words, PVP partners (i.e., program participants) and nonpartners may 
systematically differ in some way. This is a distinct possibility, given that participation in a PVP 
is voluntary. For example, firms most likely to benefit from a PVP are more likely to be 
participants. If so, a study could overstate program benefits because PVP benefits would not be 
as great if the PVP were also applied to nonparticipants.
7 Also, for a variety of reasons, large 
firms, greener firms, or firms with good management may be more likely to participate. If these 
factors are independently related to outcomes (as they probably would be), the partner sample 
will be biased. Accordingly, the analysis would have to control for these biases.  
However, researchers may not know all of the relevant characteristics that could 
distinguish between the treatment and comparison groups. Even if researchers could identify all 
relevant characteristics, some key factors (e.g., a firm’s motivation to innovate, or the presence 
of a dynamic leader to implement changes) may be impossible to measure. The effort to develop 
a complete set of control variables creates extensive data demands, particularly for PVPs that 
address more than one sector.  
Breadth of Confounding Factors 
Many factors may affect the performance of PVP participants, aside from their 
participation in a PVP. Product and process innovations are driven by sector- and firm-specific 
competitive pressure, regulations, liability concerns, financing options, and changing consumer 
tastes. Ideally, PVP participation enables firms to respond more effectively to these pressures 
and to increase innovation, but it is not likely that all innovation at a firm would result from PVP 
participation.  
                                                 
6 For examples in the literature of attempts to examine ORCR programs using statistical approaches, see Industrial Economics, 
Incorporated (2008b).  




To correctly measure PVP benefits, the analysis must control for these external factors. A 
further complication is that firms are generally in a constant state of innovation. This means that 
baseline conditions are “moving,” or intertemporal. Accordingly, benefits attributable to PVPs 
probably are due to the capacity for PVPs to accelerate innovation. Detecting innovation is easier 
than detecting earlier adoption of innovation.  
Because many, if not most, of the other drivers of innovation are changing across time 
(e.g., regulatory requirements, consumer tastes, and competition), the two-stage method also 
requires the use of carefully designed time series and comparison groups. For example, it may be 
possible to measure conditions in a treatment and comparison group at a baseline time period, 
conduct a follow-up measurement of both groups some time later, and then compare the rate of 
change or innovation in each group (i.e., a differences-in-differences approach). Although this 
approach is possible,8 it is somewhat complex, and any differences in the effects of external 
factors on the treatment and comparison groups can create significant uncertainties in the 
analysis. 
Non-Uniform Interventions and Outcomes 
To compare treatment and comparison groups, PVP interventions must be standardized. 
For example, technical assistance should be grouped into like forms of assistance and classified 
according to the following characteristics: 
  subject matter (e.g., process reengineering, product reformulation, and recycling); 
  form of assistance (e.g., in-person site or product evaluation, phone queries, written 
guidance documents, or conferences and workshops); and 
  intensity of assistance (e.g., hours or duration of assistance). 
Likewise, signaling interventions could be standardized in terms of the form of 
recognition, certification, and auditing conducted.  
                                                 
8 For example, EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance is currently implementing a pilot project that uses 
experimental design and the two-stage method to measure the impacts of EPA Region 1’s compliance assistance outreach for 
the auto body sector. However, the assistance effort is not a PVP because it focuses primarily on encouraging compliance with 
existing or forthcoming regulations, and participation is not voluntary (assistance is offered to all entities in the treatment 




Second, the beneficial outcomes of the interventions must be standardized. In the case of 
both technical assistance and signaling features, these outcomes will differ across partners in the 
following ways: 
  type of outcome (e.g., process innovation, product innovation, input reductions, change in 
product mix, changes to supply chain, and recycling); 
  scale of outcome (e.g., pounds of pollutant reduced, tons of input recycled, or number of 
processes affected); and 
  economic, health, and other social benefits of the outcome (e.g., the monetary value of 
innovations or public health improvements). 
Numerous statistical issues remain, but even the basic standardization of interventions 
and outcomes may be difficult when assessing PVPs. This is particularly true of outcome 
measures. Because they are voluntary and idiosyncratic to the needs of particular partners, there 
is no simple way to standardize, integrate, or compare different kinds of outcomes. Innovations 
tend to be specific to firms or sectors and this can prevent the development of data sets with 
uniform outcome measures and observations numerous enough to achieve statistical power. 
Also, because program partners typically self-report outcomes, it is a challenge for the agency to 
require the use of consistent outcome measures.  
In some cases, evaluators may be able to take advantage of standardized data sets in 
assessing the beneficial outcomes of PVPs. However, options are generally restricted to a limited 
set of existing databases (e.g., the TRI and Biennial Report data) that are not universally relevant 
or useful. The limitations of these data sets have curtailed the application of statistical 
approaches. In addition, these approaches may not be well calibrated to address the impacts of 
information diffusion.
9 
Ambiguous Intervention Events  
To detect program effects it is important to clearly identify the time frame of the 
program’s intervention. In one ORCR voluntary effort, the C2P2 program, a single industry 
adopted new policies all at once, and the changes in practice that followed are easily identified in 
data collected annually by the industry. In contrast, however, most PVP interventions are 
staggered across time, with rolling program admission and negotiated projects of differing 
                                                 
9 For a recent, detailed assessment of the limitations of using TRI data to assess ORCR’s NPEP program, see Industrial 




lengths. For instance, with WasteWise and NPEP, entry to the program is rolling, and 
innovations or projects do not have consistent time frames or implementation deadlines. As a 
result, it may be difficult to establish a baseline and to identify clear temporal thresholds for 
before-and-after analyses. 
Spillover Effects 
Finally, the diffusion of innovations poses a crucial challenge to the use of experimental 
design or statistical approaches to measure PVP benefits. As noted, PVPs seek to create R&D 
and other information that is appropriable. By its nature, appropriable R&D tends to diffuse 
quickly and easily, and it may be shared outside the treatment group. If PVPs facilitate new 
knowledge and practices that quickly diffuse, the comparison group may be observed 
implementing new innovations. If so, the attribution analysis will show less difference between 
the treatment and comparison groups, leading to a smaller estimate of the program’s effects. Of 
course, in such a case the opposite would actually be true—that is, if diffusion occurs, the 
program is creating particularly large benefits.
10  
In short, given that a key goal of many PVPs is the exchange of information regarding 
new technologies and practices, social benefits may arise because of behavioral change on the 
part of companies that do not participate in the programs at all. This spillover effect means that it 
may not be possible or desirable to prevent information from reaching the comparison or control 
group.
11  
4. Practical Approaches for Attributing Benefits 
Having described the obstacles to experimental design and the two-stage method, this 
paper now focuses on alternative approaches for benefit attribution. The objective is to 
recommend practical methods that are theoretically defensible but which place fewer, more 
realistic, demands on data collection and analysis. Specifically, the discussion presents a three-
level approach to attribution analysis in the context of ORCR initiatives. 
  Level 1—Initial Threshold Assessment: Threshold assessment ensures and documents 
that the PVP design is appropriate for achieving targeted benefits. The assessment 
                                                 
10 See Lyon and Maxwell (2008), who argue that PVPs are a knowledge-diffusion mechanism and that successful diffusion 
seriously complicates the measurement and detection (attribution) of program effects. 




explicitly considers the market failures discussed earlier and helps verify that the PVP 
under consideration has a defensible economic rationale.  
  Level 2—Intervention–Outcome Assessment: Assessment of interventions and 
outcomes helps ORCR verify that the resources and activities it invests in a PVP are 
logically aligned with the desired outcomes. 
  Level 3—Quasi-Experimental Designs: In some instances, ORCR may pursue 
quantitative analyses that effectively attribute benefits of a PVP, while avoiding the strict 
demands of experimental design or the two-stage method.  
Throughout, the discussion recognizes the complexity of PVP interventions and data 
limitations associated with ORCR programs. The section concludes with a discussion of several 
special outcome categories and measurement considerations unique to PVPs. 
4.1 Level 1, Threshold Evidence To Support Attribution 
The case for benefit attribution will generally be strongest in situations where the 
underlying economic rationale for government-supported PVPs is clear. This section describes 
the types of information needed to link PVP features with market failures where PVPs are most 
likely to be socially beneficial and in need of government intervention. To the extent that a 
program directly recognizes and addresses key market failures, it can be thought of as satisfying 
a fundamental threshold test for potential success.  
The discussion below first examines threshold assessment for technical assistance programs 
designed to address the public good nature of innovation. Next, the discussion considers threshold 
assessment for signaling programs designed to address information asymmetry.  
Threshold Evidence To Support Technical Assistance Attribution 
The case for attribution is strongest when technical assistance helps participants create 
and apply green R&D that is easily appropriable by others. Appropriable information can be 
thought of as discoveries that quickly and easily become common knowledge; it is easily copied, 
used, or duplicated by other institutions or competitors. In contrast, nonappropriable information 
is easier to keep private and deploy to one’s private advantage.  
Specific discoveries, R&D, and information vary in the degree to which their value is 
appropriable by the discoverer. Appropriability depends on many factors, including the nature of 
the new information; the competitive application of the information by markets; the difficulty of 




At one extreme, basic scientific discoveries (e.g., that bacteria cause disease) are often 
highly appropriable. Once discovered, they easily become common knowledge, due in part to the 
nature of the information itself (explaining or defending the new knowledge provides the key to 
its duplication) and also cultural norms that value the sharing of basic scientific knowledge.  
At the other extreme are proprietary or trade secrets that can be, and are, jealously 
guarded by discoverers. For example, many firms take great care to prevent knowledge of 
production processes, product formulas, and even management practices that give them a 
competitive advantage. “Noncompete” contracts that prevent employees from being hired by 
competitors are evidence of the incentive and ability of firms to keep some information private, 
or nonappropriable. Patentable discoveries are also nonappropriable because (by design) the 
patent system protects a discoverer’s exclusive ownership of new knowledge for a period of 
time.  
The public policy case for interventions that subsidize or assist discovery—such as PVP 
technical assistance—is strong in the former case (appropriable information) and weak in the 
latter (nonappropriable information). In the former case, the discoverer is less likely to privately 
benefit from any new knowledge their R&D investments produce. This means that the private 
financial incentive to invest is less than it should be to induce socially justified investments in 
new knowledge. 
Accordingly, attribution of technical assistance benefits to PVPs is justifiable (at least as 
a threshold test) when technical assistance encourages the discovery and application of R&D and 
other information that is appropriable. Attribution is more difficult to justify when it supports 
proprietary information. There is little or no market failure associated with proprietary 
discoveries because the private incentive to discover them is already strong. PVPs will benefit 
participants when they support proprietary R&D, but the rationale for government intervention is 





Attribution threshold for appropriability met:  
  Nonpatentable innovation 
  Innovation with broad applicability to other 
firms 
  Innovation other firms can cheaply duplicate 
  Innovation other firms can quickly duplicate 
  Innovation applicable to small firms with 
numerous competitors 
Attribution threshold not met: 
Patentable innovation 
Innovation that is only applicable to specific 
firms 
Innovation that is expensive to duplicate 
Innovation that can be adopted by others only 
after significant lag  
Focus for Attribution of PVP Benefits: Attribution of technical assistance benefits to 
PVPs should focus on assistance that clearly targets appropriable versus proprietary 
environmental information and practice. 
Therefore, when evaluating a technical 
assistance program, a practical challenge is to 
distinguish between technical assistance that 
fosters appropriable versus proprietary 
innovation and discovery. For example, 
technical assistance that was used by a partner 
to develop a patented product or process, or a 
valuable trade secret, would not pass the 
threshold test and should be excluded from 
attribution on the grounds that the PVP in this 
case is subsidizing discovery that is in the 
partner’s private interest (i.e., no market failure 
is being addressed). On the other hand, when 
technical assistance supports innovations that 
are not patentable, are easily copied by other 
firms and institutions, and can quickly and 
easily diffuse throughout a market or industry, 
the economic justification for attributing 
program benefits to the PVP is strong. Box 1 
summarizes these principles. 
Strong evidence in favor of PVP benefits is technical assistance that leads to the diffusion 
of innovation beyond a specific partner to other PVP partners or nonparticipants. Evidence of 
such knowledge spillovers points to an underlying market failure addressed by the PVP—
namely, the “free” appropriation of new intellectual property by competitors and other users. In 
short, innovations and green practices facilitated by technical assistance that diffuse to other 
firms—that is, spill over—are particularly attributable to PVPs. 
The attribution factors identified above are not “bright line” threshold tests. It is not necessary for 
a PVP to satisfy all of the threshold criteria to make the case that the program has attributable impacts. It 
is also possible that a PVP can demonstrate attributable benefits even if one or more proprietary features 
exist within a program. For example, in general, a PVP intervention that enables a partner to patent a new 




BOX 2. NPEP AND INFORMATION SHARING 
ORCR’s NPEP program provides several 
examples of the complexity of the technical 
processes and products that technical assistance 
can address. Among nine partners interviewed in 
2009, one company (a manufacturer) specifically 
noted that innovations comprised trade secrets that 
were partially, and confidentially, shared with 
clients, but not with competitors; this company 
nevertheless feels that its NPEP participation has 
furthered innovation within the company, and 
therefore within the sector. In contrast, another 
partner (an airport) has publicized its innovations 
and has actively encouraged participation in 
similar projects by other departments in the local 
government. In addition, other manufacturing 
partners have noted that interaction with firms in 
different sectors (but with similar waste-related 
challenges) have helped further their participation 
in the program. 
protection against appropriation, as in a case where competitors can cheaply and quickly “patent around” 
the partner’s patent.  
Although a “perfect score” is not critical, 
it is important to consider these attribution 
factors when designing and prioritizing program 
elements and interventions. The social and 
economic argument for both the desirability of 
intervention and the attribution of public benefits 
to the agency’s actions is strongest when the 
largest number of threshold tests is passed. 
Program managers should recognize the 
potential for furnishing participants with an 
undesirable degree of competitive advantage. 
Innovations that quickly diffuse and are 
nonproprietary tend to be less competitively 
advantageous—precisely because they are 
nonproprietary. Competitive advantage by itself 
does not disqualify the attribution of benefits, 
however; partners must expect some competitive 
advantage to justify their participation in the 
PVP. What is crucial is the degree of competitive advantage. PVPs that provide extreme 
competitive advantages are not socially desirable because they duplicate what is already in a 
firm’s private interest. Instead, a balance must be struck: enough competitive advantage to 
induce participation, but not so much that the diffusion of R&D public goods is inhibited.
12 In the 
context of EPA, publication of achievements (e.g., project summaries) may be a key factor in 
ensuring that information is appropriable.  
Threshold Evidence To Support Signaling Attribution 
The case for attribution of signaling benefits to PVPs is strongest when signaling gives 
stakeholders knowledge of green production and product features that are difficult to observe. As 
reviewed, signaling seeks to overcome market failures associated with asymmetric information. 
                                                 
12 This balance is a key feature of public policies geared toward innovation. For example, patents provide intellectual property 
rights, but only for a limited time. This feature of patents takes into account both the need to induce innovation and the social 




In many cases, it is difficult for consumers to make the technical assessments necessary to judge 
whether a product is truly green. A consequence of these information asymmetries is that 
consumers cannot condition their purchases on products’ true environmental features. This 
weakens the incentive for high-quality green firms to invest in green products and processes 
because it is difficult for them to pass on those extra costs via premium prices.  
Also, information asymmetries create market failures beyond end-product markets. For 
example, firms wishing to purchase green inputs from suppliers and other business partners may 
find it difficult to judge their environmental practices. Similarly, financial markets often look for 
signals of firms’ green practices to judge the risks associated with investment. Individual 
consumers, employees, and communities may also look for independent verification of a firm’s 
green credentials. In other words, many stakeholders may wish to base their purchase, 
investment, employment, and community development decisions on information that is hard for 
them to independently assess and verify.  
Of course, when information is clear, obvious, and credible there is no information 
asymmetry and no presumption of market failure. Some products and processes may have 
obvious environmental consequences. For example, electric vehicles and garden tools obviously 
emit less local air pollution than their gas-powered alternatives. Consumers can also rely on a 
range of green signals provided by government certification programs (e.g., Energy Star, 
recycled content, and fuel efficiency ratings). In some cases, the private sector establishes its 
own certification and standards programs, primarily to deal with supply chain information issues. 
ISO 14000 certification and testing by Underwriters Laboratories are examples of such private 
sector–driven signaling programs. Markets also rely—to some extent—on government 
enforcement of truth-in-advertising laws. 
Attribution of signaling benefits to EPA PVPs is most justifiable when recognition, 
awards, and auditing are directed at environmental quality information that is: (a) difficult to 
observe and (b) not already addressed by some other third-party certification or auditing scheme. 
For example, ORCR’s CARE (which promotes carpet recycling) highlights carpets made from 
secondary materials; this market has not traditionally enjoyed the publicity of other recycled 
product markets. Likewise, EPA’s Indoor airPLUS program is the only labeling specification in 
the marketplace that comprehensively deals with indoor air issues. Attribution is more difficult to 
justify when one or both of these conditions is not met. When both conditions are not met, PVPs 
may still be beneficial (because an additional signal is being provided), but the rationale for 




Focus for Attribution of PVP Benefits: Attribution of signaling benefits to 
PVPs should focus on awards, recognition, and auditing that target environmental 
features, costs, and footprints that are both difficult to observe and not already 
addressed by an existing third-party certification or auditing scheme. 
When analyzing PVPs, the practical challenge is to identify awards and recognition that 
provide quality signals to stakeholders that would otherwise be absent from the market. Resource 
intensity, pollution releases, green management practices, and many product features are almost 
always difficult for key stakeholders (e.g., customers) to observe easily. The complexity of 
products, processes, and supply chains; the geographic distance over which production occurs; 
and the often hidden nature of environmental damages mean that environmental performance 
will almost always be difficult to observe readily. Awards, recognition, and other signals of 
environmental performance provided by PVPs are likely to be socially beneficial when they 
address stakeholder information constraints. Attribution of benefits is most justifiable when the 
PVP does not duplicate signals provided by other third-party performance assessment schemes. 
4.2 Level 2, Intervention–Outcome Assessment 
A second level of analysis for attributing benefits to PVPs focuses on developing a 
thorough inventory of interventions and outcomes. Interventions essentially represent the 
activities and inputs that EPA program managers invest in the PVPs under consideration (e.g., 
hotline assistance, guidance documents, and so on)..Outcomes are the results that the program 
seeks to achieve. They can take many forms, ranging from near-term behavioral changes (e.g., 
reduction in the quantity of a toxic manufacturing input) to ultimate, long-term environmental 
outcomes (e.g., reduced exposures and improved public health). 
Overall, the objective of the intervention–outcome exercise is simply to provide a 
framework in which program managers can critically assess whether inputs align with the 
outcomes and environmental goals that EPA is seeking to achieve. In early planning stages, this 
type of accounting exercise can highlight key program design issues and can help allocate 
resources across a suite of related initiatives. In later stages of retrospective assessment, it can 
aid in the reallocation of resources between programs and can ensure that data needed for 
quantitative analyses are readily generated. 
Program managers have many alternatives for organizing the information in an 
intervention–outcome assessment. This paper reviews two possible approaches: (a) intervention–





PVPs could collect, organize, and report their interventions and outcomes in a 
standardized matrix format that distinguishes between type of intervention and type of outcome. 
This “binning” of interventions and outcomes will organize and clarify evaluations by making 
transparent the full range of program interventions and effects.  
The intervention side of the matrix reflects data collected by the program itself and could 
include information on the subject of the PVP (i.e., the process or activity EPA is seeking to 
influence), the form that intervention takes, and the intensity of the intervention, as shown below.  
 
Subject of intervention 
Form of intervention  
(for each subject) 
Intensity of intervention  
(for each subject–form combination) 
•  Process reengineering 
•  Supply chain alternations 
•  Recycling 
•  Disposal practices 
•  Product reengineering 
•  On-site evaluations and support 
•  Hotline assistance 
•  Guidance documents 
•  Online resources 
•  Conferences and workshops 
•  Recognition and awards 
•  EPA hours devoted to intervention 
•  Type of EPA personnel involved 
•  Duration of partnerships and 
assistance 
•  Other EPA investments 
A simple illustration might involve a program to encourage the use of a less-toxic 
production input (process reengineering). The intervention may take the form of an on-site 
evaluation in which EPA representatives identify chemical substitution opportunities. The 
intensity of this intervention could be assessed in terms of personnel or contractor hours devoted 
to the evaluation visits. 
Classifying interventions in this manner serves several purposes. First, it highlights the 
range of interventions in which PVPs are currently or potentially applicable. Second, it allows 
evaluators to assess the relative frequency with which different interventions are used. Third, it 
makes it easier to associate program costs with particular kinds of interventions (i.e., what types 
of interventions impose the greatest resource costs on the agency?). Fourth, when combined with 
outcome measures, the matrix allows a clearer analysis of cause and effect (intervention and 
outcome).  
Now consider the outcome side of such a matrix, reflecting the specific achievements of 
the PVP and its participants. Here, program managers can organize information according to the 
type of outcome, the scale of the outcome, and the ultimate benefit (environmental and/or 
economic) sought, as shown below.  




Type of outcome 
Scale of outcome  
(for each type) 
Ultimate benefit  
(for each type and scale) 
•  Process type affected 
•  Chemical input reduced or 
changed 
•  Resource input reduced or 
changed 
•  Waste stream recycled 
•  Waste stream disposal 
method or change 
•  Product or feature 
changed 
•  Volume of reduction (net of 
increases due to 
substitution) 
•  Number of processes or 
products affected 
•  Number of facilities 
affected 
•  Diffusion of changes to 
other PVP partners (using 
same metrics as above) 
•  Diffusion of changes to 
nonpartners (using same 
metrics as above) 
•  Internal diffusion of 
product or process 
•  Public health benefits expected 
(Y/N) and type (e.g., air or 
water) 
•  Ecological benefits expected 
(Y/N) and type (e.g., species or 
land cover effects) 
•  Production cost savings and 
form (e.g., input costs, liability, 
or disposal) 
•  Consumer benefits (e.g., more 
desirable product features or 
greater product variety) 
 
Continuing the illustration introduced above, the type of outcome is a chemical input 
reduction. The scale of the change could be measured in terms of the volume reduction at key 
facilities that received on-site evaluations; the overall volume reduction across all facilities; or in 
terms of the number of facilities that participated. Ultimately, benefits might be characterized in 
terms of both production cost savings for the participants and reduced exposures to the subject 
chemical at landfills or other disposal facilities. 
PVPs already collect some of the information needed for the development of 
intervention–outcome matrices. For example, NPEP’s enrollment form (questions 1a, 1b, 2a, and 
2b) provides some information on the type and scale of outcome associated with enrollment. The 
key to attribution, however, is to distinguish between outcome types and then relate them to the 
specific interventions that facilitated them. 
Again, classification will help communicate the broad range of PVP outcomes and will 
also underscore the difficulties associated with statistically controlled experimentation. But even 
a simple classification scheme such as this can help direct attention to the role that specific 
interventions play in the generation of particular benefits and the scale of these benefits—the 
essence of performance evaluation.  
Another dimension of the matrix could highlight key external factors—that is, other 
factors that could be particularly important drivers of behavioral change but that occur 
independently of the program intervention. External factors may include new regulatory 





A closely related alternative to the matrix approach is the documentation of program 
activities using a logic model (described in detail in EPA [2009]). Commonly used in EPA 
program evaluations, logic models represent a different way of arraying much of the same 
intervention and outcome information discussed above (albeit with somewhat different 
terminology). Organized in flow chart fashion, logic models typically include several elements: 
  resources and inputs for the program (e.g., staff and funding); 
  activities that the program performs; 
  outputs, defined as intermediate products or services that the program provides; 
  target decisionmakers; 
  short-term, intermediate, and long-term outcomes; and 
  external influences. 
Logic models may provide a useful organizing principle for arraying program 
information. In assessing the success of a PVP at addressing market failures, however, the key 
exercise, using either the intervention–outcome matrix or the logic model, is documenting a clear 
link between program outcomes and the elements of program design that focus on market 
failures. Figure 1 presents a logic model for Hospitals for a Healthy Environment (H2E), an EPA 
partnership program launched in 1998 with the goal of advancing waste-reduction and pollution-
prevention efforts in the nation’s hospitals. Specifically, H2E directed its efforts toward (a) 
virtually eliminating mercury-containing waste, (b) reducing the overall volume of regulated and 
nonregulated waste, and (c) identifying hazardous substances for pollution-prevention and waste-
reduction opportunities by providing a variety of tools and resources to its partners. Resources for the Future  Boyd and Manson 
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4.3 Level 3, Quasi-Experimental Approaches to Benefit attribution 
When feasible, program managers may choose to progress to a third level of benefit 
attribution in which they develop quantitative analyses for key PVP outcomes. Quasi-
experimental designs do not involve random assignment and may not involve the two-stage 
method of comparison groups. However, quasi-experimental designs often involve comparison 
groups and/or measurements of the study group over time (i.e., time series designs). Although 
these approaches do not definitively prove a program’s impact, they provide a rigorous 
assessment of a program’s influence by ruling out other plausible explanations through rigorous 
measurement and control. 
Quasi-experimental approaches can take a vast array of forms. Overall, the analysis 
generally involves tracking one or more quantitative outcome indicators and logically associating 
changes in the indicator(s) with the program intervention. A simple example might involve an 
outreach program to encourage small businesses to recycle waste oil at centralized recovery 
facilities. The analysis could simply compare recycled quantities at the local recovery facility 
before and after institution of the outreach program. If adequate data were available over time, 
the analysis could apply simple statistical techniques to verify that the change in recycled 
quantities is not due to normal economic variations. 
This type of trend analysis involves a variety of compromises in statistical rigor. The 
brand of quasi-experimental design recommended here might typically involve the following 
simplifications relative to the two-stage method. 
  The analysis may identify a suboptimal comparison group, comparing participants and 
nonparticipants without regard to aligning the secondary characteristics of the two 
groups. 
  The analysis may simply consider longitudinal data (i.e., before-and-after data) without 
establishing a comparison group. 
  The analysis may consider changes in the outcome variable without providing a 
quantitative assessment of external factors that may have contributed to the change. 
  The analysis may track changes in the outcome of interest without performing formal 
statistical tests to demonstrate statistically significant changes in the “before” and “after” 
observations. Resources for the Future  Boyd and Manson 
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Overall, the key message for program managers is to formulate quantitative analyses that 
adhere as closely as possible to “ideal” statistical analysis while making practical compromises 
where necessary. An excellent example of this principle is provided by a trend analysis 
developed for C2P2 (Lange, 2008), which compared waste-reduction metrics across different 
samples of firms and over time. The study had several analytical advantages. First, the 
researchers had access to particularly good data on waste changes over time. Second, the 
interventions and outcomes of the program are reasonably uniform across a large number of 
facilities. Third, the study was able to normalize waste levels as a function of output and other 
variables. Fourth, the C2P2 program featured a clear point in time when purchasing guidelines 
took effect across the industry. The study found a significant increase in waste reuse when the 
program was introduced. However, this finding is only suggestive of program benefits. In 
particular, it does not rise to the level of the two-stage method, because the analysis was unable 
to include many of the controls necessary to isolate the C2P2 program’s effect.  
Notably, Lange (2008) evaluates the confounding role diffusion can play in attribution 
efforts. The study found no statistical difference in reuse rates between partners and nonpartners. 
The C2P2 evaluation explored one particular “diffusion variable”—the geographic proximity of 
partners—and found that positive nonpartner outcomes were related to the nonpartners’ 
proximity to partners. This is not an iron-clad method for detecting spillover effects, however. 
First, physical proximity is one of many possible diffusion pathways; other pathways have little 
to do with geographic proximity (information flows via trade meetings, publications, and online 
resources are not geographically dependent). Second, geographic location is a proxy for many 
other intervening variables that have nothing to do with C2P2 interventions but that might 
explain adoption rates, such as state regulations, community pressures, employee socioeconomic 
characteristics, media attention, and so on. Overall, the C2P2 case study demonstrates that an 
imperfect quantitative analysis can still supply compelling evidence of program benefits, guiding 
ORCR’s decisionmaking. 
Another example of a quasi-experimental approach is the Environmental Results Program 
(ERP), an innovative approach to improving facilities’ management practices within small 
business sectors (e.g., auto body repair, dry cleaners, and printers). ERP combines compliance 
assistance, state or EPA inspections, and statistically based performance measurement to drive 
improved compliance and reduced environmental impacts of the target sector, while fostering 
efficient and strategic use of government resources. In many cases, business participation in the 
compliance assistance aspects of ERP is voluntary (though compliance with applicable 
regulations is not). ERP relies on longitudinal data by measuring performance at representative Resources for the Future  Boyd and Manson 
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samples of regulated entities before and after those businesses are offered technical assistance. 
Changes in performance may be associated with ERP. In addition to considering measured 
changes in performance, the agencies implementing ERP also qualitatively consider what other 
factors may be affecting entities’ performance (e.g., changes in economic conditions or newly 
promulgated regulations).  
4.4 Specialized Outcome Categories and Related Measurement Considerations 
This final section highlights a variety of analytical issues that program managers may 
encounter when applying the methodologies discussed above, particularly the quasi-experimental 
approaches associated with Level 3. The objective is to highlight outcome indicators that are 
relevant to PVPs and provide guidance on effective measurement metrics. The topics addressed 
include the following: 
  partners’ demand for program interventions;  
  partners’ leveraging of recognition; 
  devotion of partner resources; 
  spillover metrics; and 
  firm size as an indicator of PVP benefits.  
Partners’ Demand for Program Interventions 
Program partners may demand, apply, and invest in PVP participation. Measurement of 
this behavior represents practical evidence of program benefits, particularly when combined with 
the other types of evidence articulated in this paper. Qualitatively, ORCR collects and presents 
some data on partners’ revealed preferences when it reports success stories and associates these 
successes with program actions. But it is possible to expand this set of data to provide more 
detailed information on demand for PVPs and the services and features they provide.  
EPA offices should develop standardized demand measures that begin with the 
following: 
  participation rates (number of partners); 
  duration and consistency of participation (whether partners stay in the programs); 
  PVP resource usage rates (hotline calls, conference participation, and guidance 
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  evidence of repeat demand. 
Many programs (e.g., NPEP, WasteWise, SmartWay, and Indoor airPLUS) collect some 
of this information already.For example, see the analysis of hotline and web content usage in 
EPA's 2010 “Evaluation of the WasteWise Program.
13 But data collection could potentially be 
further standardized and analyzed across programs to be consistent with the matrix approach 
described above and to provide consistent, officewide information about program organization, 
size, and achievements.  
Leveraging of Recognition 
In the case of awards and recognition (and their role in environmental signaling), it may 
be feasible for EPA to track the ways in which partners advertise or otherwise communicate 
awards, recognition, or certification to stakeholders. For example, programs could track the use 
of awards, logos, and other forms of recognition in the following contexts: 
  product labeling (i.e., whether partners feature the recognition on their products); 
  marketing materials and other advertising; 
  annual reports and other financial reports; 
  corporate websites; and 
  corporate presentations. 
If partners perceive value in recognition and awards, there should be measurable 
evidence of their use in the partners’ own interactions with stakeholders. 
Devotion of Partner Resources 
As a substitute for direct evidence of innovation, EPA program offices could track 
partner resources devoted to program participation. Relevant indicators might include financial 
investments associated with the partnership or the number of employees and hours devoted to 
participation in the PVP. Where data exist to document them, analyses of partner investments are 
a particularly credible signal that PVP benefits are occurring.  
                                                 
13 Available at http://www.epa.gov/evaluate/pdf/wastewise_eval_rpt.pdf.In addition, EPA’s Performance Track Program 
routinely collected and maintained detailed data on memberships, renewals, and withdrawals of its partners. Although this 
program has been completed, the data collected may provide insights into data collection protocols for other programs.  Resources for the Future  Boyd and Manson 
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Spillover Metrics 
Because diffusion and spillovers are closely tied to PVP benefits—and because of the 
difficulty of attributing benefits to PVPs—we recommend that programs develop spillover 
metrics to detect knowledge diffusion. 
Spillovers are likely to occur along particular knowledge and information-sharing 
pathways that may depend on the type of innovation involved. For example, diffusion can occur 
within a firm via the partner’s management procedures, engineering standards, and employees. 
Knowledge is also likely to be disseminated via supply chain relationships. External pathways 
include trade publications, academic journals, migration of employees between firms, and 
conferences.  
Ideally, PVPs should identify specific diffusion pathways and should look for evidence of 
PVP information along these pathways in terms of: 
  internal diffusion of knowledge and practices by partners; 
  citation of PVP publications and guidance in various literatures; 
  discussion of PVP-related innovations in various literatures; 
  PVP-related procurement, disposal, recycling standards, and goals communicated to the 
supply chain; or 
  reference to PVP interventions in trade shows and other conferences. 
The WasteWise partnership program is particularly ripe for such data collection because 
it explicitly encourages endorsers to diffuse knowledge via advertising, recognition programs, 
publications, and the endorsers’ own technical assistance to other institutions. Evidence of 
diffusion is a particularly strong signal of program benefits because diffused innovations are 
most likely to suffer from underinvestment because of their public good–like properties. 
Firm Size as an Indicator of PVP Benefits 
Evaluators sometimes assume that the involvement of smaller firms is an indicator of 
program success, with the underlying logic being that smaller firms are more dependent on 
intervention to encourage innovation. However, considered closely, firm size does not have clear 
implications for benefit attribution.  
It is true that small firms will have greater difficulty conducting their own R&D. They 
also tend to operate in markets composed of large numbers of competitors. Large firms can 
internalize more benefits of R&D because they can apply discoveries to their own (presumably Resources for the Future  Boyd and Manson 
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wider) range of processes and products. Alone, these factors suggest that small firms will be 
particularly susceptible to R&D market failures because it could be more difficult for small firms 
to create, protect, and enjoy the benefits of new intellectual property.  
However, small firms often aggressively innovate, with no need for intervention. 
Moreover, large firms may find it easier to diffuse the fruits of technical assistance within their 
organizations (e.g., to multiple manufacturing facilities). This implies that a given technical 
assistance intervention may yield larger social benefits when applied to larger firms.  
Likewise, it is not clear that signaling benefits are more likely when provided to small firms. 
Small firms may have more difficulty generating recognition, certification, and awards because of their 
smaller environmental health and safety staffs. On the other hand, large firms may reach larger numbers 
of consumers with correspondingly large benefits to performance signaling. 
5. Summary  
This document outlines the challenges associated with benefit attribution in the context of 
EPA voluntary programs. The analysis suggests a variety of arguments and evidence that 
programs can use to demonstrate the benefits of ongoing or planned initiatives. The proposed 
methods are intended as a practical alternative to the two-stage method or experimental design. 
Although strict statistical approaches represent an ideal method for rigorously demonstrating 
program benefits, a variety of obstacles can impede their application. In response, this paper 
recommends a more practical approach to attribution that relies on core principles of economic 
public policy analysis and data that are more readily available. 
The proposed methodological approach is summarized in diagram below. As shown, the 
three major levels are as follows. 
  An initial threshold assessment to determine whether economic conditions (i.e., market 
failures) favor the application of a voluntary program, such as one providing technical 
assistance or signaling features.  
  An assessment of interventions and outcomes to help verify that the resources and 
activities invested in a PVP are logically aligned with the desired outcomes. 
  A quasi-experimental design and quantitative analyses that effectively attribute the 
benefits of a PVP and adhere to basic program evaluation principles while avoiding the 
strict demands of the two-stage method.  Resources for the Future  Boyd and Manson 
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EPA program offices can pursue these three assessment levels to the degree consistent 
with the nature of the programs under consideration and the resources available. For instance, a 
small voluntary program may require only the application of an initial threshold assessment, 
whereas larger, more costly programs may justify the application of all three levels of analysis.  Resources for the Future  Boyd and Manson 
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